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Electoral Design, Sub-Majority Rules, and
Representation for Future Generations
Kristian Skagen Ekeli
13.1 The Proposal
The purpose of this chapter is to present and consider two alternative models
for political representation of future generations. The aim of these models is to
promote more future-oriented deliberations and decisions in representative
democracies, and to create more public awareness and engagement about
important political issues that can have a serious impact on the living condi-
tions of near and distant future generations. The ﬁrst model has been pro-
posed by Andrew Dobson, and it can be called the restricted franchise model.1
According to thismodel, some seats in legislative assemblies should be reserved
for special representatives of future generations (hereafter F-representatives),
who should be granted the same lawmaking powers as ordinary legislators in
majority rule legislatures. These special representatives should be elected, but
the rights (a) to elect F-representatives and (b) to serve as F-representatives
are restricted to what Dobson calls the ‘environmental sustainability lobby’
(i.e. environmental groups and organizations).
The second model, which I have recently proposed, can be termed the sub-
majority rule model.2 According to this model, a minority of at least one-third
of the legislators should be granted two procedural rights in order to protect
future interests. The ﬁrst empowers a minority to delay legislation, while
the second grants a minority the right to require referendums. In contrast to
Dobson’s model, my proposal implies that legislators are selected and
accountable through ordinary periodic elections, where the whole electorate
1 See Dobson 1996. 2 See Ekeli 2009.
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can participate on equal terms. However, the sub-majority rule model grants
special procedural rights to legislators who are elected and accountable in this
way. More precisely, the model gives the right to require delays and referen-
dums to any predeﬁned numerical minority of future-oriented legislators—
that is, legislators who are concerned for the welfare of near and distant future
generations, and who wish to prevent laws that they (sincerely or in good
faith) believe have a serious negative impact on posterity.
Dobson’s model and my proposal differ along at least ﬁve dimensions, and
some of these are related.3
(1) The representatives: Who should be empowered to serve as representa-
tives of future generations in elections and legislatures? Who should be
granted special powers to represent and protect future interests in
legislatures?
(2) Selection of representatives: How should the representatives be selected?
(3) Accountability mechanisms: How should the representatives be held
accountable, and by whom (i.e. who should be the accountability-
holders)?
(4) Powers: What powers should the representatives have?
(5) Voting rules in the legislature: What voting rules should be used in the
legislature—only majority rule (Dobson’s model) or a combination of
majority rule and sub-majority rule (my proposal)?
As compared to the status quo (i.e. existing representative democratic insti-
tutions), I believe that these two models can, in different ways, serve as useful
political tools to promote more future-oriented political deliberations and
decisions in representative democracies. However, I will argue that the sub-
majority rule model has some important advantages compared with the
restricted franchise model. More precisely, my proposal has more far-reaching
and desirable effects with regard to processes of agenda-setting, deliberation,
exchange of information, and citizen involvement. The sub-majority rule
model also provides a better future-oriented system of checks and balances.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 13.2, I will present and consider
Dobson’s restricted franchise model. Section 13.3 presents the sub-majority
rule model and sets out a case for this proposal.
13.2 The Restricted Franchise Model
Dobson’s proposal is that some seats in legislative assemblies should be
reserved for special representatives of future generations. This model has two
3 More precisely, (1), (2), and (3) are related and (4) and (5) are related.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 26/8/2016, SPi
Representation for Future Generations
215
Comp. by: SatchitananthaSivam Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002833987 Date:26/8/16
Time:20:30:18 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002833987.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 216
important aspects. The ﬁrst concerns the powers of the F-representatives. These
representatives should have the same powers as ordinary legislators in major-
ity rule legislatures. First, they have proposal rights—that is, the power to
place bills on the formal voting agenda in the legislature. Secondly, they
should be granted lawmaking competence—that is, the power to vote for or
against laws in a legislature using majority rule. Unfortunately, Dobson does
not specify how many seats the F-representatives should have. For present
purposes, I will, however, assume that for instance 5 or 10 per cent of the seats
are reserved for these special representatives.
The second aspect of the restricted franchise model concerns electoral design
and Dobson’s mechanism of proxy accountability. The F-representatives
should be elected. However, the rights (a) to elect F-representatives and
(b) to serve as F-representatives are restricted to what Dobson calls the ‘envir-
onmental sustainability lobby’ (i.e. environmentalists or environmental
groups and organizations). According to Dobson, the sustainability lobby
should function as proxy or substitute future generations. More precisely, envir-
onmentalists should function as a proxy electorate (i.e. a proxy constituency)
from which proxy candidates can be drawn or selected, and these candidates
have the right to run for parliament and to serve as F-representatives if elected.4
This electoral system and its rationale will be discussed more closely in
this chapter.
With regard to the assessment of the restricted franchise model, a central
question is whether this model provides a reasonably effective and desirable
way to represent and protect future interests compared with the status quo—
that is, existing representative democratic institutions. In what follows, I will
ﬁrst set out some important arguments in support of this model (sections
13.2.1 and 13.2.2). Thereafter, I will present some of the problems it faces
(section 13.2.3).
13.2.1 Electoral Design, Proxy Accountability, and Representative
Legitimacy
The aim of mechanisms of accountability characteristic of representative
democracies is to induce representatives to act in the best interests of the
represented. In representative democracies, periodic elections are important
vertical accountability mechanisms, because they give the electorate—i.e. the
accountability-holders—the ability and power to impose sanctions or costs on
their representatives if they fail to act in what the voters believe is in their best
interest. The way periodic elections are designed in existing representative
4 See Dobson 1996: 132.
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democracies is, however, not necessarily a good mechanism of accountability
for inducing legislators to act in the best interest of future citizens. Future
generations cannot authorize representatives/legislators to act on their behalf;
nor can they hold them accountable by punishing or rewarding them during
elections. Since legislators are merely accountable to present citizens, politi-
cians and political parties will inmany cases have strong incentives not to take
a position that deviates too much from the preferences or short-term interests
of their voters, in order to avoid being punished during elections. In this way,
politicians who want to be (re-)elected depend on an electorate which is in
many cases short-sighted and impatient, and this can create strong incentives
to over-discount the future in political decision-making processes.
Dobson’s design of the restricted franchise model is an attempt to overcome
this problem of myopia—the problem of the short-sightedness of the elector-
ate and politicians. With regard to elections of F-representatives, his solution
to the problem of myopia represents a new and interesting answer to the
question of who the accountability-holders should be. Dobson assumes that
the proxy (i.e. environmentalists) should be the accountability-holders in
elections of F-representatives, because they are adequately motivated in the
sense that they can be presumed to have the interests of future generations at
heart. It can be argued that there are two sources of the proxy’s representative
legitimacy. The ﬁrst is that the proxy is presumed to care for the well-being of
posterity. The second is that the proxy has knowledge or expertise about envir-
onmental issues.
As compared to the status quo, one can argue that Dobson’s system of proxy
accountability has two advantages. First, given the care and knowledge
(or expertise) of environmentalists, Dobson assumes that the proxy electorate
will elect F-representatives that they believe will protect the interests of future
generations. If F-representatives fail to do a good job, the proxy constituency
will punish them during elections, because these accountability-holders
are adequately motivated when they evaluate the performance of the
F-representatives. Second, this mechanism of proxy accountability will create
strong incentives for the F-representatives to act in the interest of future
generations (or what they believe is in their best interest) while holding ofﬁce.
13.2.2 Agenda-Setting and Deliberation
As compared to the status quo, one important argument in support of having
special representatives of posterity in the legislature is that they can play a
central role in processes of agenda-setting and deliberation.
(1) Agenda-setting: F-representatives can have positive effects with regard
to processes of agenda-setting especially in legislatures, because they are
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empowered to place issues on the formal voting agenda. The special represen-
tatives can also create more public awareness about important environmental
issues affecting future generations. In this connection, Dobson’s hope is
presumably that a ‘representative can be an advocate who turns the whole
nation, not merely the assembly, into a public forum. The representative is an
intermediary who can expand the space for political discussion beyond gov-
ernmental institutions and at the same time bring political decisions to the
people’s attention for scrutiny.’5
(2) The deliberative value of special F-representatives: Special F-representatives
can promote more well-informed processes of deliberation in legislatures,
and the hope is that this can contribute to more future-oriented decision
outcomes. First, the F-representatives get the opportunity to present pro-
posals, arguments and perspectives that might not have been introduced
and taken into consideration in the absence of special representatives.
Secondly, the F-representatives can make relevant information (about values,
facts, problems, solutions, and options) available in the legislature. To the
extent that they play this role, this will improve the basis of information
among decision-makers. With regard to processes of deliberation, it should
be noted that the number of F-representatives and their voting power are of
secondary importance compared to the value of representing arguments and
making relevant information available in legislative assemblies.
13.2.3 Problems Facing the Restricted Franchise Model
Although something can be said for Dobson’s model as compared to the status
quo, it faces some important problems. The ﬁrst is that the restricted franchise
model is in conﬂict with the democratic ideal of ‘one person, one vote’, since
it gives the members of the proxy electorate two votes each, while the rest
of the electorate only has one. The proxy electorate can cast one vote for
F-representatives and one for ordinary representatives. As Dobson points out,
it is possible to revise the model in order to avoid this problem:
One way of catering for this might be to deprive the proxy generation of its vote
for the present generation and leave it with a vote for future generations. . . .The
sustainability lobbymight be prepared to accept such an arrangement in respect
of the following thought: that a vote for future generations is also (largely but
not wholly) a vote for a particular type of present politics—the sustainability
politics for which they would vote if they had not forgone the right to do so.6
5 Urbinati 2000: 766–7. 6 Dobson 1996: 134.
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Dobson’s response might solve this problem, but his model is still open to
other objections.
A second line of criticism is that the restricted franchise model seems to
close off both reasonable disagreement and debate about the controversial
issue of who should be empowered to serve as representatives for future
generations—in the sense that it gives one particular group or movement
(i.e. the environmental sustainability lobby) with a restricted range of perspec-
tives the privileged status of representative for future generations in advance
of public deliberation. In a representative deliberative democracy, this seems
to be problematic.7 First, environmentalists are not alone in caring for the
well-being of near and distant future generations. Second, the intergenera-
tional issues we face today do not only concern the environment, but also
other political issues (e.g. budget deﬁcits and public pension plans). Third, in a
number of cases, there exist reasonable disagreements about what is in the
best interests of posterity, and it is by no means obvious that environmental-
ists have a privileged access to the ‘truth’ in such matters. Even if one agrees
that there is a need for new forms of representation of posterity, one can reject
the idea that one ‘lobby’ (or interest group) should have special representa-
tives in the legislature who are both drawn from this lobby/interest group and
elected by its members.
The next problem concerns the effectiveness of Dobson’s model with regard
to the F-representatives’ ability and power to police, control, and sanction
myopic majorities in the legislature. The F-representatives have very limited
ability and power to check and balance the power of majorities who want to
make hasty and short-sighted decisions. Thus, as a system of checks and
balances, the model has limited value (I will return to this issue in the next
section). This does not mean that the F-representatives’ limited voting power
has no value in order to affect or inﬂuence decision outcomes. Under certain
circumstances, the F-representatives can play a central role in coalition-
building in majority rule legislatures. For example, they can trade votes on
issues they consider of minor importance in order to gain support on issues
they regard as vital.
13.3 The Sub-Majority Rule Model
The aim of the sub-majority rule model is to give minorities of legislators, who
are selected and accountable through ordinary periodic elections, certain
political tools to represent and protect the interests of future generations.
7 This problem is discussed in more detail in Ekeli 2005: 435–7.
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The common denominator of the proposed reforms is that they represent
examples of what can be termed sub-majority rules. In a recent interesting
analysis of sub-majority rules, Adrian Vermeule points out that a sub-majority
rule is ‘a voting rule that authorises (i) a predeﬁned numerical minority
within a designated voting group (ii) to change the status quo (not merely to
prevent change) (iii) regardless of the distribution of other votes’.8 According
to Vermeule, sub-majority rules are rarely or never used directly for ﬁnal
substantive decisions, such as the passage or defeat of legislation. Rather,
they are used for procedural matters—for example, to set procedures and
agendas for public deliberation and voting. This also applies to the proposed
sub-majority rules, which can be regarded as procedural rights ascribed to
predeﬁned minorities of legislators.
13.3.1 The Right of Minorities to Require Delays
Aminority of at least one-third of the legislators should be granted the right to
require that the ﬁnal enactment of a law proposal should be delayed until a
new election has been held, if they believe that the law in question can inﬂict
serious harm upon posterity. This means that a minority has the power to
demand that the bill can only be enacted after an intervening election.
13.3.2 The Right of Minorities to Require Referendums
Aminority of at least one-third of the legislators should be granted the right to
demand a referendum on a bill that can have a serious adverse impact on the
living conditions of future generations. Thus, a minority can place an issue
before the people for ﬁnal approval. With regard to this proposal, it is import-
ant that the electorate get sufﬁcient time to gather relevant information, as
well as to consider and discuss the bill. Therefore, there should be a time
interval of a least one year from the minority’s call for the referendum until
it is held. However, in order to avoid a too time-consuming process, there
should be a limit to the interval allowed—e.g. two years.
At this point, it is important to make three clariﬁcations with regard to the
sub-majority rules and their application. First, the sub-majority rules do not
privilege any particular minority of legislators, who are selected through
ordinary periodic elections where the whole electorate can participate on
equal terms. Any predeﬁned numerical minority of legislators will be given
these tools, and the hope is that future-oriented legislators will use them in
order to protect future interests. Second, a minority of legislators should only
8 Vermeule 2005: 76.
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be allowed to demand a delay or a referendum if they present a prima facie
case for the assumption that the law proposal in question can inﬂict serious
harm or risk upon posterity. Thereafter, the burden of proof should shift to
those legislators who reject the minority’s harm scenario. Third, conﬂicts
about the reliability of competing harm scenarios should be resolved by a
constitutional court (i.e. a special constitutional court or some similar body
such as the state’s supreme court), since such controversies involve issues of
constitutional law (i.e. such conﬂicts concern the distribution of powers
between minorities and majorities as speciﬁed in the constitution). In cases
where controversies arise, the legislators who want to prevent a delay or a
referendum (for instance 10 per cent of the legislators) should be allowed to
initiate legal proceedings. But, as already pointed out, in such cases the onus of
proof should rest with those who reject the minority’s harm scenario after the
minority has presented their prima facie case. It should, however, be under-
lined that when controversial cases are brought before a court, the court has
the power to reject a delay or a referendum in cases where it does not ﬁnd the
prima facie case offered by the minority convincing—that is, if the court
assumes that the law in question does not expose posterity to risks that can
seriously harm their living conditions, or if the court suspects that a minority
is abusing the sub-majority rules for strategic reasons.9
13.3.3 The Case for the Sub-Majority Rule Model
As compared to Dobson’s model, I believe that the sub-majority rule model
provides more effective and desirable political tools to represent and protect
future interests. More precisely, my thesis is this. If future-oriented minorities
use or can use the proposed procedural rights, the sub-majority rule model has
more far-reaching and desirable effects than Dobson’s model. The reason for
this is that the sub-majority rules can have signiﬁcant and extensive effects
with regard to processes of agenda-setting, intrapersonal and interpersonal
deliberation,10 exchange of information (i.e. distribution and dissemination
of information), and citizen involvement. The sub-majority rule model also
provides a better and more effective future-oriented system of checks and
balances than the restricted franchise model.
9 In view of uncertainty and disagreement about the future effects of present policies and the
reliability of alternative future harm scenarios, judicial review on the basis of this aspect of the sub-
majority rulemodel will give courts some degree of power in the lawmaking process. Such issues are
discussed more closely in Ekeli 2007a.
10 Interpersonal deliberation refers to the process of discussion with others or interpersonal
communications—e.g. debates in legislatures. Intrapersonal deliberation refers to an individual’s
internal reﬂections (or considerations), for instance, on political issues—e.g. when we read a
newspaper or watch a political discussion on TV and deliberate about the pros and cons of
alternative policies.
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AGENDA-SETTING
The power to place issues on the formal political voting agenda and the
procedural rights to determine how those issues are to be decided play an
important role in political decision-making. The proposed sub-majority rules
will affect the distribution of agenda-setting power, because they will to some
extent have the effect of distributing the competence to control the agenda
away from majorities to minorities. First, minorities are empowered to inﬂu-
ence how long an issue should be on the agenda, and to decide how the issue
should be placed on the formal voting agenda. In this way, minorities have
the power to force the majority to pay more attention to certain issues affect-
ing posterity. Second, the suggested procedural rights can give minorities of
legislators the opportunity to increase the political visibility and the public
awareness of important intergenerational issues. These points will be elabor-
ated here.
PROCESSES OF DELIBERATION
An important aim of the proposed procedural rights is to improve the process
of deliberation and decision-making about issues that can have a serious
impact on the living conditions of posterity. The purpose is to improve the
basis of information and enhance the level of reﬂection among legislators and
voters. Dobson’s model can, as we have seen, also have positive effects with
regard to processes of deliberation, but one can argue that the sub-majority
rule model can have more far-reaching effects.
In contrast to Dobson’s model, both sub-majority rules empower future-
oriented minorities to slow down the decision-making process. This means
that the sub-majority rules can promote a more thorough and well-informed
process of intrapersonal and interpersonal deliberation about certain issues or
law proposals. First, to the extent that minorities use their right to demand
delays or referendums, this will ensure that both the electorate and politicians
have the opportunity to consider the proposals in question more closely
before a decision is made throughmajority rule in legislatures or referendums.
Second, in this process they will have time to gather and distribute new and
relevant information which can in turn affect the subsequent process of
deliberation, agenda-setting, and decision-making.
Third, if a minority requires a delay or a referendum, decision-makers will
have more time to come up with, discuss, and consider alternative courses of
action, which might have more desirable consequences with regard to future
generations than the bills that were initially introduced. The hope is that this
can initiate a dynamic educative process of public deliberation—where rele-
vant decision-makers and publics are exposed to a diversity of ideas, proposals,
and problems. Moreover, compared with decision procedures which make it
possible to make more hasty and less visible collective decisions (i.e. the status
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quo inmost democratic states11), the proposed decision rules can also improve
the quality of collective decisions, since decision-makers (both citizens and
legislators) are given a better opportunity to pool their knowledge, insight,
and experience prior to voting. In these ways, the proposed procedural rights
can lead to a process of intrapersonal and interpersonal deliberation that
might lessen the problem of bounded rationality—the problem that our
knowledge, imaginations, and reasoning abilities are limited and fallible.
CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT
The restricted franchise model only involves the proxy electorate (i.e. envir-
onmentalists) in elections of F-representatives—the rest of the electorate is
excluded. As compared to Dobson’s model and existing representative dem-
ocracies, the proposed procedural rights can, as already indicated, induce
more public awareness and engage citizens more directly when it comes to
issues affecting future generations. First, if a minority requires a delay, this will
ensure that the people have the opportunity to consider the law proposal
more closely during election campaigns. Citizens will also be given the chance
to determine the composition of the legislative assembly before the law
proposal can be enacted through majority vote.
Second, a direct democratic device such as a referendum can provide a useful
institutional mechanism for engaging citizens more directly in public deliber-
ations about important intergenerational issues. In this connection, it is worth
noting that referendums can change the demand for political information and
the supply of it.12On the demand side, referendums can increase the incentives
of voters to gather information, partly as a result of more intense public discus-
sions before the popular vote. On the supply side, referendums increase the
incentives of politicians and the media to provide information. If politicians
and interest groups want to win a referendum, they are forced to inform the
public about the reasons why they are for or against the policy in question.
During referendum campaigns, these political actors have to provide informa-
tionon the issue at stake, and theymust publicly discuss and critically scrutinize
the arguments and information offered by their opponents.
A FUTURE-ORIENTED SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES
Systems of checks and balances are usually introduced in order to guard
against abuse of state power and despotism (or arbitrary use of state power).
In constitutional democracies, one central aim of checks and balances is to
provide a guard against the danger that the rulers (e.g. majorities of legislators)
use the power that is conferred on them against the ruled.
11 This also applies to the restricted franchise model.
12 See Benz and Stutzer 2004: 33–4.
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The sub-majority rule model can be regarded as a future-oriented system
of checks and balances, the purpose of which is to guard future generations
against myopic majority decisions that neglect their vital interest and
needs. The main aim of the proposed procedural rights is to empower
minorities of future-oriented legislators to function as watchdogs for pos-
terity in present political debates and struggles. They grant a predeﬁned
numerical minority of future-oriented legislators, who are elected and
accountable through periodic elections, the power to police and control
myopic majorities in the legislature. More precisely, the sub-majority rule
model has an important power-checking function, in the sense that it can
prevent the process of decision-making about issues affecting posterity from
being subject to the immediate and unlimited control of myopic majorities
of legislators. This power-checking function is absent in the restricted fran-
chise model primarily because the F-representatives do not have the power
to delay the process of legislation. Thus, an important advantage of the sub-
majority rule model is that it gives future-oriented minorities of legislators
more (real) political power to control and govern legislative processes
than Dobson’s F-representatives. As compared to Dobson’s model, the sub-
majority rule model provides a better and more effective future-oriented
system of checks and balances.
The sub-majority rule model constitutes a future-oriented system of checks
and balances that also functions as a horizontal accountability mechanism—in
the sense that future-oriented minorities are enabled and empowered to
monitor, control, and impose costs on myopic majorities in order to induce
them to act in the best interest of posterity. The costs I have in mind here are
the following.
(a) Compared with majority rule voting, both sub-majority rules create
increased decision-making costs, that is, the costs (or time and effort)
of securing or negotiating agreement on collective action. Typically,
decision-making costs increase as increasingly large majorities are
required. Both sub-majority rules and supermajority rules (e.g. a two-
thirds or a three-quarters majority) have higher decision-making costs
than majority rule, since they make it more difﬁcult to negotiate agree-
ment on collective decisions.
(b) Devices such as delays and referendums are time-consuming, andmore-
over will create opportunity costs, that is, the cost of something
(e.g. postponing a decision) in terms of an opportunity forgone and
the beneﬁts that could have been received from that opportunity. In
many situations, majorities or groups of legislators might have strong
incentives to avoid these costs, and this can encouragemajorities to take
seriously the views of future-oriented minorities.
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With regard to democratic accountability, it is also noteworthy that the sub-
majority rules can have an accountability-forcing effect—that is, they give the
predeﬁned minorities the ability and right to force the majority to make a
highly visible ﬁnal decision on certain issues or laws, rather than disposing of
the issue in some less prominent fashion.13
13.3.4 Problems Facing the Sub-Majority Rule Model
At this point, I will present three problems facing the sub-majority rule model
that must be taken into account in order to assess the desirability of my
proposal. The ﬁrst can be termed the problem of a permanent myopic supermajority.
One can imagine circumstances where amyopic supermajority (i.e. a two-thirds
majority) is more or less permanent in the legislature so that it is practically
impossible for future-oriented minorities to come into a position where they
can use the proposed procedural rights. Under such circumstances, the value of
the sub-majority rule model is seriously undermined.
The sub-majority rule model is also open to the problem of strategic abuses—
that is, the proposed procedural rights can be abused by minorities for
strategic or egoistic reasons. It might be tempting for a minority—who are
not concerned for the well-being of future generations—to require for
instance a delay in the hope that a bill they dislike or oppose would never
be passed. In order to analyse how the problem of strategic abuses affects the
desirability of the sub-majority rule model, it is worth keeping the following
considerations in mind. First, the requirement that the minority has to pre-
sent a prima facie case for demanding a delay or a referendumwill presumably
reduce the danger of strategic abuse, because it would make it difﬁcult for a
strategically motivated minority to come up with cogent public justiﬁcations
for demanding delays or referendums for the sake of future generations.
Second, constitutional courts have, as mentioned, the power to reject a
delay or a referendum in cases where they believe that a minority is abusing
the sub-majority rules for strategic reasons. Third, minorities who more or
less openly abuse the suggested devices will expose themselves to the risk of
being punished during elections. Fourth, even if certain minorities abuse the
procedural rights, the sub-majority rules can in such cases create a more
thorough and future-oriented process of deliberation about important inter-
generational issues.
Finally, one can object that the proposed sub-majority rules face problems
of democratic legitimacy—that is, problems related to the rightful democratic
exercise of coercive political power. The main reason for this is that the
13 See also Vermeule 2005: 79.
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sub-majority rules have a counter-majoritarian character, in the sense that
they give aminority of legislators the power to impede the will of themajority.
This raises the question of whether the counter-majoritarian character of the
sub-majority rules is problematic in view of requirements of democratic legit-
imacy. In order to consider this question, it is important to keep in mind the
following considerations and ideas.14 First, the sub-majority rule model
implies that majority rule should be used for ﬁnal substantive decisions—
that is, the passage and defeat of legislation in legislatures and referendums.
The sub-majority rules are only used for procedural matters. They are primarily
used to set agendas for deliberation and voting (through majority rule).
Second, it is, on the one hand, a widely held assumption in political and
democratic theory that democratic legitimacy does not require that the pro-
cess of decision-making in legislatures should be subject to the immediate and
unlimited control of majorities. On the other hand, it is a common assump-
tion (especially in deliberative democratic theory) that the legitimating force
of majority rule decisions is altered after a process of careful and well-informed
deliberation. The idea is that there is an important difference between the
counting or aggregation of judgements (or preferences) before and after a
process of deliberation, because deliberation can create or promote what
Melissa Schwartzberg calls ‘judgments worth counting or aggregating’.15
A central aim of the proposed sub-majority rules is precisely to create judge-
ments worth counting through majority rule in legislatures and referendums.
Third, one can argue that democratic legitimacy requires institutions or
procedures designed to promote careful and well-informed deliberation in
order to show respect for all those who are signiﬁcantly affected by majority
rule decisions—including future generations who are voiceless and vulner-
able, since they cannot inﬂuence present decision-making processes. The idea
is this. If a group of persons makes a majority rule decision without a prior
process of deliberation where alternative courses of action and their impact on
various affected parties are considered carefully or seriously, then the decision-
makers do not treat those affected with respect, and the legitimacy of the
decision is signiﬁcantly undermined. In this connection, the sub-majority
rules can enhance the democratic legitimacy of majority rule decisions.
13.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have considered two alternative models for political repre-
sentation of future generations. On the one hand, I have argued that Dobson’s
14 In Ekeli (2009), I discuss other aspects of the democratic legitimacy of the sub-majority rules.
15 See Schwartzberg (2014). See also Ekeli 2007b: 97–9.
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restricted franchisemodel has some interesting advantages compared with the
status quo (i.e. existing representative democratic institutions), but that his
model faces some important problems. On the other hand, it has been argued
that the sub-majority rule model provides more effective and desirable polit-
ical tools to represent and protect future interests than Dobson’s model.16
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